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Abstract
Concomitant with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on December 1, 2009, many of
the alleged weaknesses of the mechanisms of protection of fundamental rights are in the process
of being addressed: the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (”Charter”)
has acquired binding force, the European Union is due to accede to the European Convention
of Human Rights, and the Fundamental Rights Agency (”Agency”) has been established as a
European Union (”EU”) body in charge of monitoring the correct implementation of fundamental
rights throughout the Union. This Essay will address three main questions. First, a question of
legitimacy: is it of any consequence that the Charter has the same legal value as the treaties but is
not part of the treaties? Second, a question of subsidiarity: what is the right level for the protection
of fundamental rights? Last, a question of efficiency of the protection of fundamental rights: what
role can the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency play?
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CHALLENGES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU AT THE
TIME OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
LISBON TREATY
Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere*
INTRODUCTION
Concomitant with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
on December 1, 2009,1 many of the alleged weaknesses of the
mechanisms of protection of fundamental rights are in the
process of being addressed: the Charter of the Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (“Charter”)2 has acquired binding
force, the European Union is due to accede to the European
Convention of Human Rights,3 and the Fundamental Rights
Agency (“Agency”) has been established as a European Union
(“EU”) body in charge of monitoring the correct
implementation of fundamental rights throughout the Union.4
In the 2009–2014 Commission there is a commissioner, Viviane
Reding-Justice, in charge of fundamental rights.5 Is the situation
now satisfactory? In this new context, what are the challenges still
facing the protection of fundamental rights? Obviously the
* Professor and former President, University of Paris II. A similar version of this
Essay was presented in Cambridge, England, at a December 2009 conference discussing
the Treaty of Lisbon and its aftermath.
1. The Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. C 306/1, at 13 (consolidated
version divided into the Treaty on European Union, 2008 O.J. C 115/13 [hereinafter
TEU post-Lisbon], and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2008 O.J.
C 115/47 [hereinafter TFEU]).
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. C 364/1
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights].
3. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. C 306, at 13.
4. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 2.
5. See, e.g., Press Release, European Parliament, Summary of Hearing of Viviane
Reding—Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20100111IPR67125/
20100111IPR67125_en.pdf.
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answers depend not only on the constitutional evolution of the
European Union but also on various external and
complementary factors.
Before trying to propose some elements of an answer, it is
important to recall some landmark events on the question of
human rights in the EU. As is well known, the EU began as the
European Economic Community (“EEC”), totally economically
oriented; it was not designed to be a human rights organization.
The notion of human rights enshrined in the general principles
of European Community (“EC”) law was forged by European
Court of Justice (“Court of Justice” or “Court”) case law,
inaugurated by Stauder v. City of Ulm,6 to counteract Germany’s
questioning of the supremacy of EC law.7 Subsequently, the
Court constructed a human rights doctrine in a series of relevant
cases, but from a pragmatic perspective, without defining an
overall human rights policy.8 The EEC did have one specific
human rights provision, article 119 of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community, which required equal pay for
men and women.9 Further, the EC was relatively quick to develop
human rights aspects of its external policy and enlargement
policy, with repercussions on its internal policy. The EC moved
gradually towards political initiatives as well as economic ones,
implying a more direct and substantial concern for human rights,
particularly in the context of action taken in the field of
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, the so-called third
pillar, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht’s Treaty on
European Union (“Maastricht TEU”) in 1993. The initial Treaty
on European Union’s article 6 reflected formulas of the Court of
Justice’s case law concerning the respect of fundamental rights as
general principles of Community law. However, the Court
nonetheless held that the Community had no competence to

6. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419.
7. See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAW 204–05 & nn.9–11
(1999).
8. Id. at 204.
9. The initial Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community article 119
was absorbed into article 141(1) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter EC Treaty] (and now is
found in TFEU, supra note 1, art. 157, 2008 O.J. C 115).
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legislate in the domain of basic rights in its well-known Opinion
2/94.10
EU institutions, particularly the European Parliament,
developed concern for human rights issues; but the Cologne
European Council’s designation in June 1999 of the convention
charged with drafting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was
the first formal initiative aimed at defining proper EU
parameters of human rights protection. Until then, the
incremental judicial and political developments concerning
fundamental rights in the European Union were the product of
reaction to historical circumstances, not the result of a
thoughtful EU policy on human rights. Due to the difficulty of
the new approach, the convention convened in 1999 gave
preference to codification of existing practices instead of taking
innovative routes. The Charter used the European Convention of
Human Rights11 as its main source of inspiration, enriched by
provisions of the EC and EU treaties, secondary legislation, and
the case law of the Court of Justice, plus some other international
sources or constitutional traditions common to the Member
States. The Charter’s main novelty was its chapter on social
rights, the formulation of which borrowed widely from that of the
Community Social Charter12 and EC secondary legislation.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights, proclaimed in Nice in
December 2000, subsequently became a master card in the
constitutional debate, as a potential bill of rights of the future
constitution of the European Union.13 The decision to include
the Charter in extenso as Part II of the draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe14 was part of the process of the
constitutionalization of the EU. Nonetheless, the substance of the
Charter was not discussed at all at the convention of 2002–2003,

10. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶¶ 27, 33–35.
11. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
12. Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, Dec. 9, 1989,
available at http://www.aedh.eu/the-community-charter-of.html.
13. See Tony Joris & Jan Vandenberghe, The Council of Europe and the European
Union: Natural Partners or Uneasy Bedfellows?, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (2008); John L.
Murray, Fundamental Rights in the European Community Legal Order, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
531, 547 (2009).
14. See Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Part II, 2004 O.J. C
310/1, at 41–54 (never ratified) [hereinafter Draft Treaty].
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which prepared the initial draft constitutional treaty, nor at the
subsequent Intergovernmental Conference; instead, participants
only discussed the question of its possible binding effect and the
limits thereof.15
The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty marks the renunciation
of any structuring role the Charter could have played in the
constitutional order. The explicit provisions of the new article 6
of the Treaty on European Union16 (“TEU”) post-Lisbon on
fundamental rights have the merit of clarifying sources. However,
the Charter is referred to as having the same legal value as the
treaties, but is not reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty itself. TEU
article 6 only includes the Charter along with the European
Convention of Human Rights to which the Union is mandated to
adhere (article 6.2) and other fundamental rights not included
in the Charter which altogether will constitute general principles
of EU law (article 6.3).
Other new TEU post-Lisbon provisions merit attention,
which all tend to reduce the significance of the Charter. TEU
post-Lisbon article 2 enumerates the values on which the Union
is founded, making an express reference to protection of the
rights of persons belonging to minorities.17 A new general
obligation to combat exclusion and discrimination is formulated,
including solidarity between generations and protection of the
right of the child.18 Further, the jurisdiction of the European
Court of Justice is substantially expanded to areas such as police
and judicial cooperation in the area of criminal law, which are of
clear relevance to the protection of fundamental rights.

15. Council of the European Union, 2007 Intergovernmental Conference [ICG]
Mandate, ¶ 9 & n.3 (2007). The working group in charge of the Charter at the
convention of 2002–2003 was ready to accept any concession required by the opponents
to the Charter (among whom the British were vocal) concerning its scope, the
conditions of its interpretation, or the value of explanations referred to in the Charter
in order to include it in the draft. The general provisions of the Charter (articles 52 to
54) were adopted in consequence and the Charter became Part II of the draft
Constitutional Treaty. See Draft Treaty, supra note 14, art. II, 2004 O.J. C 310/1, at 41–
54.
16. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, art. 6, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19.
17. Id. art. 2, at 17. Minorities are referred to in articles 21 and 22 of the Charter.
18. Id. art. 3(3), at 28. Note that the entire article 21 of the Charter deals with nondiscrimination.
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Additionally, TEU post-Lisbon provisions emphasize democracy,
participation, and transparency.19
At this point in time, it seems interesting to examine to what
extent the questions concerning fundamental rights which
predated the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty remain partly
unanswered despite (and sometimes because of) various
provisions of the treaty.
This Essay will address three main questions. First, a
question of legitimacy: is it of any consequence that the Charter
has the same legal value as the treaties but is not part of the
treaties? Second, a question of subsidiarity: what is the right level
for the protection of fundamental rights? Last, a question of
efficiency of the protection of fundamental rights: what role can
the EU Fundamental Rights Agency play?
I.

THE CHARTER HAS THE SAME LEGAL VALUE AS THE
TREATIES BUT IS NOT PART OF THE TREATIES
A. Primary Law by Reference

After the Draft Constitutional Treaty failed in ratification
referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the general
political reaction to any forms of constitutional symbols affected
the Charter. The political leaders considered that the Charter
could no longer appear as Part II of the Treaty; if maintained, it
would have to have a lower profile. A direct mention in article 6
TEU of the Lisbon Treaty was preferred to a specific protocol.
Consequently, the text of the Charter does not appear anywhere
in the official primary text of the published treaties. In contrast,
Protocol 3020 and Declarations 1, 53, 61, and 6221 provide for
19. Broad consultation with concerned parties, including NGOs, is becoming the
norm at the EU level. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, arts. 11(1), 11(2), 11(3), 2008 O.J.
C 115, at 21. See National parliaments are equipped with a new role in overseeing EU
legislation. Id. art. 12, at 21; Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the
European Union, 2007 O.J. C 306/01, at 148. For the first time in the history of
European integration, an instrument of direct democracy is introduced at the EU level.
One million citizens who are nationals of a “significant number of Member States” can
invite the European Commission to submit a proposal of a legal act. See TEU postLisbon, supra note 1, art. 11(4), 2008 O.J. C 115/13, at 21.
20. EC Treaty, supra note 9, Protocol 30, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37.
21. See Council of the European Union, Final Act of the IGC, 2007 O.J. C 306/231,
at 249, 267, 270.
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restrictions on the application of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, either in general or with regard to specific Member
States: the Czech Republic, Poland, and the United Kingdom.
TEU post-Lisbon article 6.1 stipulates: “The Union
recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on December 12,
2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”22
Accordingly, the Charter does not have by its nature the
status of primary law; it is primary law only because the TEU
accords it “the same legal value as the Treaties.”23 There is no
special dignity given to the substantive content of the Charter,
nor does it have a clause of perpetual nature. Incidentally, in the
absence of special provisions thereupon, one may wonder how
the Charter might be amended in the future. Moreover, the
recognition that the Charter should have the same legal value as
the treaties is immediately balanced by text limiting the scope of
the Charter and its interpretation. Article 6.1 TEU goes on to say:
The provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way
the competence of the Union as defined in the Treaties.
The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be
interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in
Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and
application and with due regard to the explanations referred
to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those
provisions.24

There are a number of limiting provisions, some mentioned
directly in article 6.1, and others that appear in the general
provisions of the Charter and were added to the initial text of the
Charter during the elaboration of the Draft Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe.25 These general limitations are in
addition to the numerous specific limitations inserted in the

22. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See generally Draft Treaty, supra note 14. These limitations refer to the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, national legislation
implementing principles contained in the Charter, national laws and practice, and
explanations annexed to the Charter providing guidance for its interpretation. Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 52–54, 2007 O.J. C 303/1, at 13–14.
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various substantive provisions of the Charter.26 Further,
according to TEU post-Lisbon article 6.3, the “rights, freedoms
and principles set out in the Charter” are put on the same level
as “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European
Convention . . . of Human Rights . . . and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States” which
“constitute general principles of Union’s law.”27 This means that
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) (now
named the General Court) may supplement the substantive
provisions of the Charter by using other sources of fundamental
rights as long as they qualify as general principles of Union law.
At the very moment when the Charter acquires the authority of
primary law, that authority is undermined.
To a certain extent, the period that ended with the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty may appear as the golden age of
the Charter, freely used by EU judges as the authoritative
instrument of reference concerning fundamental rights. The
Charter proclaimed in Nice by the Presidents of the European
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, although not
binding as such, has been progressively referred to by the CFI
and by the Court of Justice, encouraged in that direction by its
Advocates General who considered it as the most valuable
expression of general principles of EC/EU law.28 More recently
the Court of Justice referred directly to the Charter as a direct
source of fundamental rights either because a directive referred
to the Charter in its recitals,29 or because of the generally
accepted authority of the Charter.30 Because the TEU postLisbon has included the Charter among other sources of primary
law, the Charter has gained more influence at the level of
Member States. But ultimately, the substantive provisions of the
Charter have no more authority than any other provision of the

26. See, e.g., arts. 27, 28, 30, 34, 2007 O.J. C 303/1, at 8–9.
27. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, arts. 6.1, 6.3, 2008 O.J. C 115/13, at 19.
28. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, The Queen v. Sec’y of State for
Trade & Indus., Case C-173/99, [2001] E.C.R. I-4881, ¶¶ 26–27.
29. Parliament v. Council, Case C-540/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-5769, ¶ 4 (concerning
the validity of a directive on family reunification).
30. See, e.g., Laval un Partneri, Ltd. v. Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05,
[2007] E.C.R. I-11,767, ¶ 2; Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n. v. Viking Line ABP, Case C438/05, [2007] E.C.R. I-10,779; Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslern, Case C-432/05, [2007]
E.C.R. 2271, ¶ 37.
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treaties and its scope, encapsulated in written law, is more limited
than that of other general principles of EU law.
B.

Scope of the Charter: Fundamental Rights and the Competences of
the Union

When TEU post-Lisbon article 6.1 takes care to underline
that the Charter shall not extend the competences of the Union,
this is not new—article 51.2 of the Charter heralded this from
the origin, and that was subsequently reinforced in the second
version (Part II of the Draft Constitutional Treaty and the text
proclaimed in 2007).31 The purpose of this reservation is to
diminish the anxiousness of those who are afraid that the
recognition of a right in the Charter could have the effect of
engendering an EU competence concerning such right. A
number of eminent lawyers have demonstrated that such fear is
the result of insufficient understanding of the mechanism of
protection of fundamental rights in the Union.32 Fundamental
rights limit the actions of the Union; they do not found new
competences, as the Court very clearly stated in its Opinion
2/94.33 For instance, the Union, in the exercise of its own
competences, has an obligation to respect freedom of religion;
this does not imply in any way that it has competence to legislate
on religious matters.34
These fears exist and have existed from the beginning of the
discussion of the Charter; it is of the essence of fundamental
rights that they relate to the person in his or her entirety while an
international organization of the type of the EU has only
conferred competences. There exists an essential contradiction
between the fundamentality of the Charter rights and the
limitations imposed by the Treaties to the scope of their
competences. The vicissitudes during the renegotiation of the
Lisbon Treaty and its entry into force demonstrate that these
31. The new redaction of article 51.2 of the Charter adds the sentence: “The
Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or
modify powers or tasks defined by the Treaties.” Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra
note 25, art. 51(2), 207 O.J. C 303, at 13.
32. See, e.g., Jean-Paul Jacqué, Le Traitéde Lisbonne une vue Cavaliére, 44 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPÉEN 439, 447 (2008).
33. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. I-1759, ¶¶ 27, 33–35.
34. Compare the text of the Charter concerning freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion with that of TFEU art. 17, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 55.
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fears and contradictions are still there, reinforced by the
recognition that the Charter now has the authority of primary
law.
If we examine the fears expressed by the President of the
Czech Republic concerning the possible effect of the Charter on
Beneš decrees dating from the 1940s,35 it is clear his concerns are
more political than the result of serious legal advice. However,
who can say with certainty that there is no issue concerning the
exact scope of the Charter taken together with the uncertain
boundaries of EU competences, and that article 6.1 TEU gives a
definite answer?
The scope of the Charter is determined in its article 51. This
provision establishes that the Charter applies to the institutions
and bodies of the Union, with due regard for the principle of
subsidiarity and to the Member States “only when they are
implementing Union law.”36 Then we turn to the Explanations to
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which according to article
6.1, should be used for the interpretation of the Charter:
As regards the Member States, it follows unambiguously
from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the
requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the
context of the Union is only binding on the Member States
when they act in the scope of Union law. The Court of
Justice confirmed this case-law in the following terms: “In
addition, it should be remembered that the requirements
flowing from the protection of fundamental rights in the
Community legal order are also binding on Member States
when they implement Community rules.” Of course this
principle, as enshrined in this Charter, applies to the central
authorities as well as to regional or local bodies, and to
public organisations, when they are implementing Union
law.37

35. See Steve Peers, The Beneš Decrees and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
STATEWATCH, Oct. 12, 2009, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/oct/lisbon-benesdecree.pdf.
36. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, art. 51(2), 2007 O.J. C 303, at
13.
37. Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights title VII, 2007 O.J.
C 303/17, at 32 [hereinafter Explanations] (citations omitted).
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One may note the variation in vocabulary. Article 51 of the
Charter says “only when they are implementing Union law.”38
The Explanations speak of acting “in the scope of Union law,”
but cite the recent case law which refers to “implementing”
Union law. Whatever the imperfection of redaction, the correct
interpretation of article 51 would seem to be not what it says but
how it has to be understood in the light of the case law, and that
means that the Charter might apply to Member States when they
are acting within the scope of Union law. But even that remains
unclear and uncertain because the boundaries of EU law depend
on an evolution of the case law of the Court, which no one can
anticipate.
Some critical comments have recently been published
concerning the unpredictability of the Court on the question of
EU competencies.39 The problem is not that fundamental rights
cover wide areas that do not necessarily coincide with the limits
of competence of the Union: this is of their very nature as
instruments of protection of individuals. The problem comes
from the complex system according to which competences are
conferred to the Union but are frequently implemented by the
Member States. The uncertain limits of the scope of Union law
have the consequence that no one can anticipate the possible
impact of the intersection between Union law and the rights
enshrined in the Charter. The late Judge Pescatore cited the
“surface de contact” between EC law and human rights.40 Political
concerns naturally arise, reinforced by the recognition that the
Charter has the legal authority of primary law, and not alleviated
by the affirmation that the Charter shall not extend the
competences of the Union. The Charter may yet have
unexpected results when issues arise that were not initially
intended to fall within the realm of EU law (for example, family
life, patronymic name, and private property). Protocol 30 may
38. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, art. 51.
39. See e.g., Editorial Comments, The Court of Justice in the Limelight Again, 45
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1571, 1571–79 (2008).
40. Pierre Pescatore, La Coopération Entre la Cour Communautaire, les Juridictions
Nationales et la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme Dans la Protection des Droits
Fondamentaux: Enquête Sur un Problème Virtuel [Cooperation between the Community Court,
National Courts, and European Court of Human Rights in the Protection of Fundamental Rights:
Examination of a Virtual Problem], 466 REVUE DU MARCHÉ COMMUN ET DE L’UNION
EUROPÉENNE 151, 156 (2003).
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prove not to be the shield that Poland and the United Kingdom
wanted.41 The problem does not come from the way fundamental
rights are defined in the Charter, but rather from the uncertainty
of the scope of EU law which still remains under the Lisbon
Treaty.
C. Interpretation of the Charter: Balance Between Fundamental Rights
and Economic Freedoms
The Charter has the same legal value as the treaties but is
not a part of the treaties; it is by a Treaty of Lisbon provision that
the Charter acquires a dimension of primary law. This may have
unpredictable consequences when the Charter has to be
interpreted in case of conflict between provisions of the treaties
and rights enshrined in the Charter. The recent decisions of the
Court in 2007 in Viking and Laval42 indicate, first, that the Court,
after the signature of the Lisbon Treaty but before its entry into
force, was ready to accept that the Charter could create legal
obligations and, second, that in case of conflict between
fundamental rights and fundamental economic freedoms
established by the treaties the latter might prevail (the Court’s
conclusion in Laval,43 later reiterated in Rüffert44). The cases
present not so much an issue of rights opposed to principles, or
an issue of justiciability under the Charter’s article 52.4 or
Protocol 30 of the Lisbon Treaty, but rather a question of
balance between rights. In Laval, for example, the Court
analyzed the social right to strike as an exception to the free
movement of services, one of the treaty’s fundamental economic
freedoms.
It is unlikely that under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will
embark on a more human-rights-oriented profile. Although the
economic potentialities of the European Economic Community
have been more or less exhausted by the completion of the single
market and the achievement of the four freedoms (even if many
41. On the interpretation of Protocol 30, see Michael Dougan, The Treaty of Lisbon
2007: Winning Minds, Not Hearts, 45 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 617, 665–71 (2008).
42. Int’l Transp. Workers Fed’n. v. Viking Line ABP, Case C-438/05, [2007] E.C.R.
I-10,779; Laval un Partneri, Ltd. v. Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Case C-341/05, [2007]
E.C.R. I-11,767.
43. Laval, [2007] E.C.R. I-11,767, ¶¶ 103–11.
44. Rüffert v. Niedersachsen, Case C-346/06, [2008] E.C.R. 1989, ¶ 44.
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fields of possible economic harmonization subsist), the EU, now
a hybrid body and a significant world political actor, retains its
economic origins. In contrast, in human rights thinking,
following the views of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights, a
right-holder is seen as an individual per se and fundamental
rights are interpreted and applied objectively. The EU model is
very different. Freedom of movement and other EU-based
freedoms are firmly attached to EU citizenship; economic
freedoms represent the very structure of the Union, while the
other fundamental rights—for example, social rights—enshrined
in the Charter do not, even if they correspond to competences
existing in the treaties (the current TFEU chapter on Social
policy).45 The European Trade Union Conference’s proposed
clause in the Lisbon Treaty, which would have set as a principle
that fundamental social rights should prevail over the
fundamental economic freedoms of the Union, was not
adopted.46 Therefore we may assume that the Court of Justice will
continue to use its discretion in determining the correct balance
between economic freedoms and social rights on a case-by-case
basis, using various modes of reasoning: proportionality,
exceptions, and derogations.47 The task of the Court will become
more and more difficult with the frequent absence of consensus
between the twenty-seven Member States on economic and social
questions.
This impression that the present state of affairs should
remain unchanged is reinforced by the mention in article 6.3
TEU that general principles of EU law will continue to play their
role as a source of fundamental rights in parallel with and as a
complement to the Charter and the European Convention on
Human Rights. Fundamental rights in the Lisbon Treaty have a
restrictive and not constructive function.

45. TFEU, supra note 1, arts. 151–61, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 114–19.
46. European Trade Union Confederation, Res. EC.179, (Mar. 4, 2008), 4
(responding to the Court judgments in Viking and Laval), available at
http://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf_ETUC_Viking_Laval_-_resolution_070308.pdf.
47. See, e.g., Schmidberger v. Austria, Case C-112/00, [2003] E.C.R. I-5659, ¶ 60;
Omega Spielhallen v. Bonn, Case C-36/02, [2004] E.C.R. I-9609, ¶¶ 1–2.
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II. WHAT IS THE RIGHT LEVEL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
It seems quite sensible to consider that the respect of
fundamental rights should be recognized and ensured at the
level where decisions are taken and substantive legislative or
regulatory power is exerted. Recent history also adds the
experience of mechanisms of supervision at a supranational level,
either regional or universal. In the early European Community,
the protection of fundamental rights received its initial
inspiration not only from the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States, but also from principles enshrined in
international conventions of which Member States were
signatories or parties, principally the European Convention on
Human Rights. The question of the relationship between the
protection granted by the European Convention of Human
Rights and that proper to the EC/EU system has been a
permanent feature of the European law landscape that the
Lisbon Treaty addresses clearly. But there are other dimensions
linked to globalization and the claim for national identity that
the new treaty leaves as they stand.
A. Adherence of the European Union to the European Convention of
Human Rights
The Lisbon Treaty’s TEU article 6.2 states that the Union
shall accede to the European Convention of Human Rights and,
unsurprisingly, that “[s]uch accession shall not affect the Union’s
competences as defined in the treaties.”48 Adherence by the EU
to the Convention will require negotiation and conclusion in
accordance with the provisions of TFEU article 218, which
requires unanimity in the Council and the consent of the
European Parliament.49 The Council of Europe has long
foreseen this. Some institutional adaptations will have to be made
on both sides, but the result will have two significant advantages.
First, powers of action within the EU legal order will become
subject to external supervision in the same manner as
comparable powers exercised by legislative, administrative, and
judicial authorities of the Member States. This will avoid artificial
48. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 19.
49. TFEU, supra note 1, art. 218, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 144–45.
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constructions50 presented with only mitigated success to the
European Court of Human Rights when it has reviewed in recent
years the behavior of EU institutions,51 and will serve to
guarantee the application of a common code of fundamental
values. Second, this should help to achieve the coherence
between the Charter and the Convention that article 52.3 of the
Charter addresses. Once the Union is a party to the Convention,
the provisions of the Convention, together with the case law of
the Strasbourg Court, should serve as a minimum standard. This
will not prevent EU law from providing more extensive
protection, through either the Court’s interpretation of the
Charter or the introduction of new general principles of human
rights not contemplated at the time of the drafting of the
Convention in the 1950s.52
The process of EU accession will certainly take some time.
One may also expect problems in achieving ratification. The
EU’s accession may well increase the burden on the already
overloaded European Court of Human Rights, making the
modifications introduced by protocol 14 to the Convention even
more welcome.
B.

Globalization and Alignment to Universal Standards

The prevention of terrorism has recently shown that the EU
cannot isolate itself from universal human rights constraints. The
European Union, to the extent it holds competences previously
held by sovereign states and now transferred to it through the
combined treaty provisions concerning internal market
economic freedoms and the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, has to comply with the obligations imposed by UN
Security Council resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.53 However, the Yusuf54 and Kadi55 judgments
50. This term refers to the phenomenon that arises from the obligation of victims
of a violation of the ECHR by an EU institution to bring a complaint against all the
Members States rather than the institutions themselves. Because the EU is not a party to
the Convention, there is no way to bring a case directly against EU institutions.
51. See, e.g., Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251 (1999).
52. This is, for instance, the case as regards article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights as compared with article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
wording concerning family rights has been modernized to cover relationships other
than marriage).
53. U.N. Charter arts. 39–51.
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demonstrate that the standard of protection of fundamental
rights that the Security Council Sanctions Committee considers
when deciding on measures that freeze the assets of persons
included on a list of presumed terrorists has little to do with
accepted European codes of values. Is it possible that such
sanctions should be implemented in the European Union,
without any margin of discretion, through EU legal instruments
such as common positions of the Council and EC regulations?
The answer of the CFI in Kadi was that it followed from the
principles governing the relationship between the international
legal order under the United Nations and the Community legal
order that the contested sanction regulation, since it was
designed to give effect to a resolution adopted under a provision
of the UN Charter affording no latitude in that respect, could
not be the subject of judicial review. However, conscious of the
importance of the respect of a minimum standard of human
rights, the CFI surprisingly introduced the idea that it could and
should examine the compatibility of the contested regulation
with the norms of jus cogens considered as a minimum standard
of human rights protection under international law.56 The CFI
then concluded that the principles of jus cogens had not been
infringed.
On appeal, the Court of Justice, in its judgment of
September 3, 2008, took a different view.57 The Court considered
that the judicial review of the lawfulness of the contested
regulation in the light of fundamental rights is “a constitutional
guarantee forming part of the very foundations of the
Community.”58 As a consequence, it belongs to the Court “in
accordance with the powers conferred on it by the EC Treaty,
[to] ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the
lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the fundamental
rights forming an integral part of the general principles of
Community law, including the review of measures which . . . are

54. Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, Case T-306/01, [2005] E.C.R. II3533.
55. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council, Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C415/05 P, [2008] E.C.R. I-6353.
56. Kadi v. Council and Commission, T-315/01 [2005] E.C.R. II-3649, ¶ 226.
57. Kadi & Al Barakaat, [2008] E.C.R. I-6353, ¶¶ 88, 314, 327.
58. Id. ¶ 290.
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designed to give effect to resolutions adopted by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.”59
The issue cannot be presented more clearly: what is the
right level for the definition of fundamental rights standards?
Should the principle of supremacy of international law prevent
the European Union from imposing the respect of its own
human rights standards when implementing international
sanctions in its own legal system, using its proper instruments of
regulation and judicial review? Interestingly, the Commission
tried, in its submission to the Court, to defend a sort of “so lange”
type of reasoning, arguing that so long as under the UN system of
sanctions the individuals and entities concerned had an
acceptable opportunity to be heard through a mechanism of
administrative review, the Court should not intervene in any way
whatsoever.60 In response, the Court scrutinized the reexamination procedure before the UN Sanctions Committee,
and the amendments recently made to it, before holding that the
re-examination procedure did not offer sufficient guarantees of
judicial protection of rights. Therefore the Court considered that
it had a duty to proceed to a full examination of the lawfulness of
the contested regulation in the light of fundamental rights,
which form part of the general principles of Community law. The
Court ultimately concluded that the contested regulation
infringed several rights principles (i.e., right to defense, right to
be heard, and right of property).61 A door remains open for
reconsideration in the unlikely event that the UN establishes a
system of sanctions guaranteeing judicial protection.
At the moment, while the Lisbon Treaty underlines the
specificities of EU external action, there seems to exist a certain
tendency of the Court to proclaim the EU’s constitutional
identity and, accordingly, resist the primacy of international law.
Other examples can be cited in the area of trade law or the law of
the sea, such as the Court’s judgments in FIAMM62 and
Intertanko.63 The debate concerning the respective application of
59. Id. ¶ 326.
60. Id. ¶ 319.
61. Id. ¶ 330.
62. FIAMM & FEDON v. Council, Joined Cases C-120–21/06 P, [2008] E.C.R. I6513.
63. The Queen, on the application of Intertanko v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Case
C-308/06, [2008] E.C.R. I-4057.
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international standards of protection of human rights in
comparison to European ones—henceforth enshrined in the
Charter and the other sources referred to in the new article 6
TEU—does not supersede another, more traditional debate on
the relationship between European and national level of
protection of fundamental rights.
C. European and National Protection of Fundamental Rights
This classical theme remains of interest because of some
recent developments in national constitutional court case law.
Article 53 of the Charter, defining the “Level of Protection,”
states that nothing in the Charter “shall be interpreted as
restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental
freedoms as recognised, in their . . . fields of application . . . by
the Member States’ constitutions.”64 The national constitutional
courts did not wait for the Lisbon Treaty to accord the authority
of primary law to the Charter. The well-known classical case law
of German and Italian constitutional courts concerning their
protection of fundamental rights has been enriched by French65
and Spanish constitutional courts: respect for the primacy of
EC/EU law to the extent it does not interfere with or contradict
fundamental rights or fundamental values expressed in the
national constitution and constitute an essential element of
national sovereignty.
Interestingly, the decision of the German Constitutional
Court of June 30, 2009 on the Lisbon Treaty66 is centered on the
structural problems of the European Union and its democratic
legitimacy. The question of fundamental rights arises on two
occasions. First, the Court examines the extent to which the right
to vote is sufficiently respected, the right to vote being
considered equivalent to a fundamental right and anchored in
human dignity, a fundamental element of the principle of
democracy.67 Further, examining the extent of transfer of powers
to the European Union, the German Constitutional Court
recommends a narrow interpretation of those Lisbon Treaty
64. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, 2007 O.J. C 303/1, at 14.
65. See, e.g., CC decision no. 2004-496DC, June 10, 2004, O.J. 192, 11,182.
66. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30,
2009, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, ¶ 210 (F.R.G.).
67. Id. ¶ 210.
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provisions that may have an impact on the citizens’ circumstances
of life, private space, political action, and social security.68 It
recommends the same narrow application of the provisions on
criminal law and criminal procedure:
To the extent that in these areas, which are of particular
importance for democracy, a transfer of sovereign powers is
permitted at all, a narrow interpretation is required. This
concerns in particular the administration of criminal law, the
police monopoly, and that of the military, on the use of
force, fundamental fiscal decisions on revenue and
expenditure, the shaping of the circumstances of life by
social policy and important decisions on cultural issues such
as the school and education system, the provisions governing
the media, and dealing with religious communities.69

The words used by the Federal Constitutional Court remind
us of precise cases decided by the Court of Justice. The German
court’s judgment clearly inspired the Czech Constitutional Court
in its decision of November 3, 2009.70
No striking conclusion can be drawn concerning the
protection of fundamental rights, except that the national courts
reaffirm their own legitimate role—the Court of Justice must
pragmatically take into account this request for a restrictive
interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty when fundamental rights are
affected. This is in line with the Lisbon Treaty’s TEU article 4.2,
which underlines that “[t]he Union shall respect the . . . national
identities” of Member States “inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional.”71 However, it becomes
clear that a multilevel system of protection of fundamental rights
has to be considered, combining national, regional and universal
mechanisms, in reaction to multilevel threats.

68. Id. ¶¶ 226, 249.
69. Press Release, Federal Constitutional Court, Act Approving the Treaty of
Lisbon Compatible with the Basic Law; accompanying law is unconstitutional to the
extent that German legislative bodies have not been accorded sufficient rights of
participation (June 30, 2009).
70. Press Release, Constitutional Court, The Treaty of Lisbon is in conformity with
the Constitutional Order of the Czech Republic and there is nothing to prevent its
ratification (Nov. 3, 2009).
71. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 1, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 18.
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III. EFFICIENCY OF THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
AGENCY
As underlined above, the first aim of the European
Community legal order was not the protection of an individual’s
fundamental rights, but rather the construction of an internal
market in order to create a common European future.
Fundamental rights were only gradually recognized and only to
limit the discretion of supranational institutions. The recognized
rights took the shape of unwritten general principles used by the
Court in its process of judicial review. However, after the
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties added TEU articles 6 and 7,
the concern for fundamental rights contributed to the
determination of the Union’s objectives and activities, and
induced the development of a more constructive policy in that
area. In 1993, the European Council set out the well-known
Copenhagen criteria, which the then Central European applicant
nations had to fulfill before they could join the EU in 2004 and
2007. The first Copenhagen criterion required the applicants to
be representative democracies with a respect for fundamental
rights. This political policy requirement set by the European
Council and enforced by the Commission during the preaccession period indicated that the monitoring and enforcement
of human rights mattered as much as ex post judicial review. The
view that negative control should be supplemented by positive
action, i.e., active political and administrative promotion of
fundamental rights, eventually led, after the adoption of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights, to the creation of the
Fundamental Rights Agency.
In the 1990s, the growing power of xenophobic parties in
several Member States72 as well as continuing structural problems
in the treatment of minorities such as the Roma people in
Central Europe73 drove the process for establishing a European

72. Far-right xenophobic parties have achieved significant minorities in national
and regional parliaments in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands
since the mid-1990s.
73. See István Pogány, Minority Rights and the Roma of Central and Eastern Europe, 6
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“Nor have minority rights instruments reversed the
escalation in anti-Roma sentiment and violence that has been a feature of the CEE
region since the ousting of Communist administrations.”).
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Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (“Centre”),
which was created by EC Regulation 1035/97 of June 2, 1997.74
The Centre’s prime task was to provide “objective, reliable and
comparable data” on the phenomena of racism, xenophobia,
and anti-Semitism at the European level.75 The Centre was
mandated to examine the causes, consequences, and effects of
these manifestations, and identify examples of successful
counterstrategies. After the adoption of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the European Council, in December 2003,
stressed in its conclusions the importance of human rights data
collection and analysis with a view to defining Union policy in the
field of human rights. The European Council decided to
broaden the mandate of the Centre to become a human rights
agency. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was established
by Council Regulation 168/2007 of February 15, 2007 and
commenced its work on March 1, 2007.76
The Agency is one of about thirty EU administrative
agencies. They carry out administrative tasks, employing
observational and scientific expertise that the Commission is not
equipped to provide. It is significant that the Agency is not
denominated as a “Human Rights” Agency, but as a
“Fundamental Rights” Agency. First, this echoes the title of the
Charter; the Agency is supposed to become a center of expertise
for fundamental rights issues at the EU level, with the aim of
making the contents of the Charter more tangible. Further, the
term fundamental rights, which was preferred by the Council and
the European Parliament to that of human rights, seems to refer,
at least in Europe, more frequently to domestic constitutional
guarantees while human rights is the term customarily used for
international instruments.77 The Agency thus aims at the
promotion of individual rights through administrative activity in
complement to judicial protection. Its scope and influence
remain limited.

74. Council Regulation No. 1035/97, 1997 O.J. L 151.
75. Id. art. 2.
76. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, 2007 O.J. L 53/1.
77. See J. von Bernstorff & A. Von Bogdandy, The EU Fundamental Rights Agency
within the European and International Rights Architecture: The Legal Framework and Some
Unsettled Issues in a New Field of Administrative Law, 46 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1023–33
(2009).
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A. Limited Scope
Pursuant to article 2 of Regulation 168/2007, the Agency’s
objective is “to provide the relevant institutions, bodies, offices
and agencies of the Communities and its Member States . . . with
assistance and expertise relating to fundamental rights.”78 This
ambition meets a number of practical limits stemming from its
statute: the Agency has no legislative or regulatory powers, no
quasi-judicial competence similar to what an ombudsman would
have (it cannot deal with individual complaints), and no
authority to adopt legally binding decisions with effect upon
third parties. The Agency’s powers are quite limited in trying to
serve as a basis for significant administrative action.
In accordance with article 3(3) of the regulation, the Agency
“shall only deal with fundamental rights issues in the European
Union and its Member States when implementing Community
law.”79 This is even more restrictive than the Charter, which
refers in article 51(1) to the entire field of EU law. Thus, the
regulation was not intended to enable any review of activities in
the areas of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
under the TEU,80 the so-called third pillar, a field that is
particularly sensitive when it comes to the protection of
fundamental rights. However, a Council Declaration of February
12, 2007 regarding the consultation of the Agency within the socalled third pillar indicates that “the Union institutions may,
within the framework of the legislative process . . . each benefit,
as appropriate and on a voluntary basis, from such expertise also
within the areas of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
matters.”81
Notwithstanding the limitation implied by article 3(3), the
French Council Presidency in the second semester of 2008
commissioned an opinion by the Agency on the fundamental
rights conformity of a draft framework decision on the use of air
Passenger Name Records (“PNR”) for law enforcement purposes
78. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, art. 2, 2007 O.J. L 53/1.
79. Id. art. 3.
80. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2002 O.J. C 325/05
(as amended by the Treaty of Nice, 2001 O.J. C 80/1).
81. See Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Council Regulation
Establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Doc. No. 6166/07, 4
(Feb. 2007).
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under TEU articles 29, 30(1), and 34(2).82 In its opinion, the
Agency concluded that part of the draft framework decision
violated European fundamental rights standards under the
European Convention of Human Rights and the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights and that modifications were therefore
necessary.83 The fact that an EU institution presented a specific
request made it possible for the Agency to intervene. In the
future, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty should put an
end to the special status of the field of cooperation in police and
criminal affairs because the field is now covered by TFEU articles
82 to 89. Note however, that the U.K. and Ireland by Protocol 21
will not take part in such cooperative measures.84
Article 3(3) of the Regulation 168/2007 states that the
Agency “shall deal with fundamental-rights issues . . . in its
Member States when implementing Community law.”85 The focus
on implementation instead of the broader formulation “within
the scope of application of Community law” seems deliberate,86 it
authorizes the exclusion of cases where Member States derogate
from Union law. Yet the more recent case law of the Court of
Justice, which expands the concept of implementation, needs to
be taken into account although, as mentioned earlier, there is a
risk of provoking negative reactions from the part of some
Member States’ constitutional courts and political circles.
B.

Preventive Role of the Agency

The role of the Agency is a preventive one: it functions as an
expert network identifying relevant fundamental rights issues
with a view toward developing and reforming EU legislation. It
may contribute to diminishing the likelihood of subsequent court
intervention.

82. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Opinion on the Proposal for
a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data for Law
Enforcement Purposes, (Oct. 28, 2008), available at http://www.fra.europa.eu/
fraWebsite/research/opinions/op-pnr_en.htm.
83. See id. ¶¶ 4, 10–13, 18–23, 28–31.
84. Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in regard
to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, annexed to the TEU post-Lisbon, supra
note 1.
85. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, art 3(3), 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 4.
86. See the discussion concerning the scope of the Charter, supra note 15.
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The Agency can only give advice. Assistance may be
provided to the political institutions where they request opinions,
conclusions, and reports from the Agency.87 These contributions
can have an impact upon the legislative process, but only if an
EU institution has requested such an opinion or report.
In the framework of its mandate to disseminate information,
the Agency publishes thematic reports based on its analytical
research and surveys.88 This limitation to thematic rather than
particular national topics may be interpreted as preventing the
Agency from disseminating information on occurrences in a
specific Member State. However, it seems impossible to envisage
thematic analysis without reference to the legal and factual
situation in the Member States concerned. For instance, the
Agency is just starting a survey on violence against women;89 facts
and figures will be provided by Member States. To the extent it is
in position to provide relevant information, the Agency may also
become involved in a procedure under article 7 TEU.
The Agency, which is an EU body, was also designed, as the
Preamble to Regulation 168/2007 makes clear, in light of a
model of specialized independent institutions promoting human
rights, developed by the UN.90 This model has led to the creation
of national human rights institutions in a number of countries.
In a 1993 resolution, the UN General Assembly defined
principles of independence and pluralism to be applied in the
organization and functioning of these bodies (“Paris
Principles”).91 The reference to the Paris Principles in Recital 20
of the regulation suggests that compliance with them should be
considered. While pluralism seems to be achieved in the various
institutions managing the Agency, there is a serious restriction to
its operational independence due to the fact that article 5(1) of
the regulation confers upon the Council the competence to
adopt the “Multiannual Framework” for the Agency.92 The
Commission must propose this Framework, after consulting the
management board of the Agency when preparing its proposal.
87. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, arts. 4(1)(c)–(d), 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 4.
88. Id. art. 4(1)(f), at 5.
89. Dick Leonard, The FRA Gets down to Work, THE EUROPEAN VOICE FOREIGN
POLICY CENTRE, available at http://fpc.org.uk/about/staff/dick.leonard.
90. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, pmbl., 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 2.
91. G.A. Res. 48/134, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/134 (Dec. 20, 1993).
92. Council Regulation No. 168/2007, art. 5(1), 2007 O.J. L 53/1, at 5.
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In brief, the mandate conferred to the Agency and the
conditions for its operations are not in line with the idea of an
independent human rights institution. The Agency depends on
the Commission and the Council for its multi-annual work
program.93 The Agency is not mandated to pronounce ex officio in
the course of legislative procedure, but can only do so upon
request of an EU institution. The scope of the Agency is
restricted to the implementation of EC law; even if the entry into
force of the Lisbon Treaty incorporates cooperation in police
and criminal affairs into the scope of the Agency, it remains that
the Regulation imposes a restrictive view of the mandate of the
Agency concerning monitoring of the respect of fundamental
rights in Member States. The Agency contributes to the provision
of comparable and reliable information and data at the
European level. A grand name for a modest task! It is difficult not
to conclude that the mandate of the Agency should be widened
in order that the Agency may provide a more effective
contribution to the implementation of fundamental rights.
CONCLUSION
The entry into force of the Lisbon treaty has been received
with relief by all those who considered that the institutional
debate had lasted too long and hampered the progress of
European policies. As regards the protection of fundamental
rights, the Lisbon Treaty is a landmark, but less significant than it
may appear at first. The Charter acquires the authority of
primary law, but not that of a bill of rights of the Union; its
contribution to the protection of fundamental rights is to be
made together with other sources of equivalent value, namely
other general principles of Union law. A multilevel system of
protection of fundamental rights emerges, made more complex
than before by the strong affirmation of the European identity by
the Court of Justice, by the strong affirmation of national identity
by national constitutional courts, and by the Lisbon Treaty itself.
Further, one may doubt the possible efficiency of the Agency of
Fundamental Rights as a common instrument of control of
implementation. Concerning fundamental rights, there is still
much to do and to think about.
93. Id. pmbl., at 2.

